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A TRIBUTE TO CHIEF JUDGE
ELBERT P. TUTTLE
AN APPRECIATION OF JUDGE
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE
Arthur H. Deanf
When the writer first met Elbert P. Tuttle, he was an associate
editor of The Cornell Daily Sun. The writer was a lowly competitor.
Tuttle explained the work so courteously and clearly that friendly and
sympathetic relations were established-which still continue.
World War One intervened, and Tuttle served as a second lieu-
tenant in the Army after training at Plattsburg.
He married a most charming girl, Sara Sutherland of Newman,
Georgia. They have two children.
We were to meet again in the fall of 1922 as classmates at the
Cornell Law School, where Tuttle was editor-in-chief of the Quarterly
and the writer was managing editor.
In volume seven of the Cornell Law Quarterly, Tuttle wrote a
note' on the now famous case of Truax v. Corrigan,2 in which he crit-
icized the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taft. In the opinion, Jus-
tice Taft "laid down a rule which . . .would have put an end to
[practically] every legislative enactment that gave countenance to a
curtailment of property rights, irrespective of the urgency of conflict-
ing rights." 3
While in law school, Tuttle financed and built a small apartment
house on the Cayuga Heights Road. So, as a law student, he was strug-
gling with contractors, contractors' liens, and union jurisdiction. He
rented one of the apartments to Professor Charles K. Burdick of the
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1921, LL.B. 1923, Cornell University.
1 7 CORNFLL L.Q. 251 (1922).
2 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
3 7 CORNELL L.Q. 251, 252 (1922).
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Cornell Law School, and his problems in not wishing to offend a be-
loved teacher, while sticking up for his rights as a landlord, somewhat
complicated his student and editorial life.
He and Sara rented a Faculty House from Professor Samuel P.
Orth on East Avenue, just a few feet away from Boardman Hall, then
the home of the Law School. There he and Sara often entertained us
with gracious Southern hospitality and delicious food, while we bored
poor Sara to death by pursuing the dialectics of the law, of which we
never tired.
Studying under Woodruff, Bogert, Burdick, MacCaskell, and Ste-
vens, we revered Brandeis, Cardozo, Learned Hand, Holmes, Hughes,
Ames, Roscoe Pound, Williston, Lord Mansfield, and Sir George Jessel.
After graduation, Tuttle went to Atlanta to practice law with his
brother-in-law, William A. Sutherland, where he had a distinguished
career and argued many important cases.
One of the highlights of Tuttle's career as a lawyer was his able
and successful representation of the petitioner in the celebrated case
of Johnson v. Zerbst.4 In that case the Supreme Court held that Tut-
tle's client, a defendant in a criminal prosecution, could not be held
to have waived his sixth amendment Constitutional right to be repre-
sented by counsel by merely acquiescing to a trial without counsel.
The Court said that the only type of waiver it would accept
would be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege."5
Unlike many newcomers to the South (he is a native of California
but grew up in Honolulu), Tuttle did not acclimatize himself to local
Democratic politics but remained a strong Republican and active in
that party's work.
In World War Two, as a lieutenant colonel, he fought in Guam,
Okinawa, Leyte, and the Ryukyus. He was wounded and cited for
exceptional and meritorious service in military operations while serv-
ing as Battalion Commander of the 304th Field Artillery of the 77th
Infantry Division Artillery Battalion, United States Army. He was
awarded the Bronze Star, the Legion of Merit, the Purple Heart with
oak leaf cluster, and the Bronze Service Arrowhead.
At the end of World War Two, he returned to Atlanta and be-
came president of the Atlanta Bar Association and vice-president of
the Georgia State Bar Association and was nominated by President
Truman to be a Brigadier General in the Officers Reserve Corps.
4 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
5 Id. at 464.
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He served effectively at the Republican Convention in 1952. He
was a member of the Georgia delegation and, along with Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge, who was then Dwight Eisenhower's campaign
manager, Tuttle helped to bring about the nomination of General
Eisenhower.
After Eisenhower's inauguration in 1953, Judge Tuttle was ap-
pointed as chief counsel to the Treasury Department. In September
1954, he was appointed to the bench as a judge on the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, with headquarters in New Orleans. He was
appointed Chief Judge in 1961. Tuttle has recently relinquished the
Chief Judgeship but he will remain on the Fifth Circuit as a Circuit
Judge.
Since becoming a member of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Judge Tuttle has demonstrated once again his well-known character,
integrity, and judicial ability by taking a leading role in judicial ef-
forts to guarantee the free and equal exercise of constitutional rights
to all Negroes and whites living within the states of the Fifth Circuit.
Perhaps Judge Tuttle's efforts in this field may be best appreciated
by recalling the role that he has played in cases attempting to secure
for Negroes their constitutionally-guaranteed right to participate mean-
ingfully in Southern political life. The writer speaks specifically of
Judge Tuttle's role in the Georgia reapportionment cases, the numerous
voter-registration cases that he has considered, and the Julian Bond case.
Judge Tuttle participated in the decision of three important cases
challenging the methods of legislative apportionment in the State of
Georgia. He was a member of the three-judge district court that held
the Georgia county-unit system, pursuant to which the state's prima-
ries had been conducted, unconstitutional as it was then structured.6
Subsequently, Judge Tuttle participated in the first case in which
the apportionment of a United States congressional district was chal-
lenged.7 A majority of the three-judge district court on which Judge
Tuttle was sitting voted to dismiss the complaint because it presented
a "political" question. However, Judge Tuttle dissented from the dis-
missal. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the position
taken by Judge Tuttle in his dissent, and reversed the district court.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, said:
We agree with Judge Tuttle that in debasing the weight of
appellant's votes the State has abridged the right to vote for mem-
6 Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), modified, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
7 Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962), rev'd sub nom. Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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bers of Congress guaranteed them by the United States Constitu-
tion, that the District Court should have entered a declaratory
judgment to that effect, and that it was therefore error to dismiss
this sUit.8
In the final Georgia reapportionment case, Judge Tuttle, writing
for a three-judge district court, held unconstitutional the method by
which the Georgia legislature was apportioned.9
Although the field of attempting to secure the right to vote for
Negroes living in the South was once a flourishing area of the law, the
Voting Rights Act of 196510 has supplanted most of the court-made law
on the subject. However, Judge Tuttle's James Madison Lecture at the
New York University School of Law is an illuminating account of the
way in which the Fifth Circuit was often required to use its ingenuity
in order to overcome the intransigence of state voting officials.",
Judge Tuttle's concern that Negroes be permitted to participate
effectively in the political process of the South is most recently re-
flected by his dissent from the holding of a three-judge district court
in the Julian Bond case.' 2 The district court upheld, over Judge Tut-
tle's dissent, the refusal of the Georgia legislature to seat Julian Bond,
an elected Negro state representative who had made public statements
opposing United States involvement in Vietnam. Subsequently, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the three-judge district court.13
The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Tuttle that the Georgia legis-
lature could not refuse to seat Representative Bond.
An indication of the high esteem in which Judge Tuttle is held
may be gleaned from a telegram that he received from Ralph McGill
of Atlanta. In Armstrong v. Board of Education,14 Judge Cameron of
the Fifth Circuit, who has consistently opposed Judge Tuttle in civil
rights cases and who had not been assigned to that particular case,
filed a dissenting opinion on his own initiative. In the dissent Judge
Cameron attacked Chief Judge Tuttle for allegedly assigning the four
"liberal" judges, who comprised a minority of the Fifth Circuit bench,
to most of the important civil rights cases.15 In response Mr. McGill
sent the following telegram to Judge Tuttle:
8 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US. 1, 4 (1964).
9 Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 384 U.S. 210
(1966).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. I 1965).
11 Tuttle, Equality and the Vote, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 245, 263 (1966).
12 Bond v. Floyd, 251 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ga.), rev'd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
13 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
14 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 908 (1964).
15 Id. at 358.
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That fellow in New Orleans reminds me of a favorite adage "Listen
to the fool's reproach; it is a kingly title." Don't let that New Or-
leans character concern you. Your integrity is a great rock and the
slander of little men will be forgot in a few days. All good wishes.
At the Harvard Commencement exercises on June 17, 1965, Judge
Tuttle received an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws with a citation
reading: "The mind and heart of this dauntless judge enhance the
great tradition of the federal judiciary."
In June 1949, Tuttle was elected a trustee of Cornell University
where he has brought realism and clarity to the board's work. As chair-
man, the writer relishes Judge Tuttle's timely interventions, help in
our discussions, and decisive courage in the field of social relations.
He is a warmhearted, generous, courageous person with a sterling
character, a Puritan sense of conscience, and a no-nonsense attitude
about what the Constitution really means.
The character of the man may be judged by what he said in an
address to the students of Emory University:
SERVICE
The professional man is in essence one who provides service.
In a very real sense his professional service cannot be separate
from his personal being.
He has no goods to sell, no land to till.
His only asset is himself.
It turns out that there is no right price for service, for what is
a share of a man worth?
If he does not contain the quality of integrity, he is worthless.
If he does, he is priceless.
The value is either nothing or it is infinite.
It was never necessary for Tuttle to discuss his duty and to weigh
the pros and cons of personal consequences. He saw his duty clearly and
acted accordingly.
We are proud to salute him as a distinguished Cornellian, fellow
American, and friendly participant in the great field of civil rights
for all, without distinction as to race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
CHIEF JUDGE TUTTLE AND THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT
John Minor Wisdom-
Before putting pen to paper I asked two men who have worked
closely with Elbert Tuttle how, in a word, they would describe his
outstanding quality. One of the men is the Deputy Clerk of Court for
the Fifth Circuit; the other is a member of our court. The over-
burdened Deputy Clerk somehow remembered that Judge Tuttle's first
opinion concerned electric motors.' He hesitated a moment, then
answered, "Judge Tuttle's been going like an electric motor ever since
his first opinion back in October 1954." Our brother judge did not
hesitate. "I can give it to you in one word: integrity." Each of these
answers correctly characterizes Judge Elbert Parr Tuttle.
The motor has never run down. Year after year, Judge Tuttle sits
more often and writes more opinions than any other judge on the
court. What is more, no other judge on the court allows himself as
short a lapse of time between the post-argument conference, when an
appellate case is tentatively decided, and the final draft of the opinion.
No one should infer, however, that the high speed at which Judge
Tuttle works affects the quality of his judicial craftsmanship. Llewellyn
would say that Judge Tuttle's decisions are in the Grand Style: They
reflect respect for precedent and legal tradition, but they are guided
by reason and principle. 2 Judge Tuttle writes lean, strong English.
He has a purist's feeling for the right word and correct syntax, and a
good newspaperman's discriminating eye for the significant details and
how to place them in logical order.3
Judge Tuttle served as Chief Judge for six and one-half years.
During this period the motor has been running at a greatly accelerated
speed. The administrative duties of any Chief Judge are more time-
consuming than lawyers and laymen realize. The duties are especially
taxing in the Fifth Circuit, which is the busiest federal circuit. In the
last six years our appellate caseload has doubled: 1188 appeals were
filed during our 1966-67 term. In 1954, when Judge Tuttle was ap-
pointed to the bench, the court was increased from six to seven judges.
A few years later it was increased to nine. We now have a court unique
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
1 C. & H. Air Conditioning Fan Co. v. Haffner, 216 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1954).
2 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 36 (1960).
3 See, e.g., Tuttle, Equality and the Vote, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 245 (1966) (7th annual
James Madison Lecture of the New York University School of Law).
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in the American judicial system: thirteen active judges and three
working senior judges.4 This is an experiment in judicial administra-
tion that will have far-reaching consequences.5 In addition, we have
a large number of three-judge district courts-forty-five last term, twice
as many as in any other circuit.
Contrary to common opinion, the civil rights movement is not
primarily responsible for the great surge of litigation in our circuit.
The three basic causes are: (1) the growth of industry and population
in Texas, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana and, to a lesser extent, in
Alabama and Mississippi; (2) the general increase in federal question
litigation; and (3) the recent influx of post-conviction appeals. Judge
Tuttle and the rest of us in the court would be busy if we never had a
civil rights case. Moreover, when it comes to difficult cases, I would as
soon struggle with guidelines in a de facto segregation case as with
the problems in a Texas or Louisiana case involving, in one package,
oil and gas law, community property, and federal taxes.
Of course, a court with federal jurisdiction over six of the eleven
Confederate States does carry a heavy part of the burden of civil rights
litigation. Judge Tuttle's judicial career has coincided with the
Negroes' march toward equality that began with the School Segre-
gation Cases. He was appointed to the court only a few months after
the Supreme Court decided the first Brown case in May 1954.6 Since
then, day in and day out, Judge Tuttle has lived with civil rights
problems. So have we all. But he has been responsible for shepherding
a court of very unsheeplike judges at a time of social ferment, when
the court, as an institution, was exposed to the severe stresses and
strains produced by civil rights litigation.
Because the Fifth Circuit draws its judges from a broad region,
it is better insulated from local prejudices and parochial prides than a
smaller court drawn from a more homogeneous region. A large number
of judges from as many as six states is an advantage to a court of appeals
in performing its function as a federalizing agency.
Unfortunately, an oversized court for a broad region generates
two vices. First, the fact that our judges live in ten different cities and
4 There is one vacancy on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. At present
there are three judges from Texas, one from Mississippi, and two each from Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana. The district tier consists of 59 active judges and 10
senior district judges.
5 Four judgeships are temporary. The Judicial Conference of the United States has
recommended -that these judgeships be made permanent and that two additional judge-
ships be established.
6 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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sit in seven different places in six states complicates judicial adminis-
tration and tends to deinstitutionalize the court. Second, like any
group of fifteen men from six states, our judges vary widely in tempera-
ment, background, politics, social outlook, inherited traditions, and
acquired convictions. After a period of modest apprenticeship, many
judges develop work habits, a style of writing, a way of constructing
an opinion, and a general approach to decision-making almost im-
pervious to suggestions from other members of their court. As Justice
Walter V. Schaefer, one of the country's finest judges, has remarked,
there is always "[t]he danger . . .for the judge that his image of the
ideal judge may be the face that looks back at him from the mirror
as he shaves." 7 But judges develop an independence of mind unre-
lated to pride of opinion and the charm of the face in the mirror. In
final analysis, every decision turns on the conscience of the indi-
vidual judge. A judge's independence is, of course, relative. It is re-
stricted by the Constitution, statutes, decisions of the Supreme Court,
Erie and many other doctrines, the nature of the judicial function,
and all the traditional curbs on judicial initiative imposed by the re-
quirements of jurisdiction, stare decisis, standing, and the accepted
procedural restraints of an adversary system of litigation. But it
is the individual judge's conscience that tells him whether he is
honestly interpreting the Constitution, giving full weight to a statute,
and logically applying the law to the facts-in short, whether he is de-
ciding in accordance with The Law.
Thus, besides administering a circuit having an unprecedented
flood of litigation, the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit has had to
administer an unusually large and complicated judicial institution
composed of nine to fourteen independent thinkers at a time when
there are stronglyconflicting views on the meaning of the Constitution
and the proper application of principles of American federalism.
Only a man with Judge Tuttle's rectitude, self-discipline, tolerance
for the opinion of others, and unselfish dedication to a federal judge's
obligations, could have shepherded the Fifth Circuit through the
history-making but divisive problems the court has confronted since
1960 and still have retained the affection of all his brothers on the
court. Judge Tuttle retires as Chief Judge from a strong, respected
court that is also a cohesive judicial institution. In good part, this must
be attributed to his scrupulous regard for the integrity of the federal
system and for the system of law itself.
7 Schaefer, Good Judges, Better Judges, Best Judges, 44 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 22, 23 (1960).
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This brings me back to the point my brother judge made, that
Elbert Tuttle's outstanding quality is his integrity. This is the attri-
bute litigants and lawyers look for first in a judge. Properly so. I
relate it, however, not just to moral and intellectual honesty which
judges share with other men, and not just to that high level of integrity
which federal judges should share with all other judges and with
Caesar's wife. I relate it also to Judge Tuttle's profound understanding
of the importance of preserving the integrity of federal judicial process.
Justice Frankfurter has said:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient
objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline
and self-criticism, incertitude that one's own views are incontest-
able and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But these are
precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are
precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from those
entrusted with ... judicial power.8
These are the qualities a court expects of its chief judge. Elbert Tuttle
did not disappoint us.
Justice Frankfurter had reference to the presuppositions of judi-
cial process generally. I refer to the presupposition that the integrity
of judicial process in the federal system requires federal courts to stand
an around-the-clock watch over the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Reliance of litigants upon other guardians and other forms of
protection is not enough when the rights of the nation and nationally-
created or nationally-protected rights are jeopardized by state or local
action. Judge Tuttle has pointed out:
It was not until the Emancipation Proclamation created a
new, easily identifiable class of citizens, having in common with
each other the distinguishing characteristics of race, color, poverty,
illiteracy, and lack of attachment to the land, that it became ap-
parent that neither a commonality of interests nor the multiplicity
of interests among citizens would be adequate to protect the
peculiar interests of the new class. It must be borne in mind that,
politically, the Negro population of the Southern states did not
exist prior to the adoption of the thirteenth amendment to the
Constitution. [While, of course, the thirteenth amendment abol-
ished slavery, it took section one of the fourteenth amendment
to give the former slaves citizenship within the state of their resi-
dence and the United States.]
Then, for the first time, the people of the United States found
it necessary to interpose national prohibitions affecting the elec-
8 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952).
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torate. This was accomplished, of course, by the adoption of the
fifteenth amendment.9
Judge Tuttle early recognized one of the key facts about civil
rights. "In resisting change, especially in political and sociological
areas, time is what counts."'1° Accordingly, it has
devolved upon the appellate courts, to a greater extent than had
theretofore been usual in American jurisprudence, to fashion
means to give effect to principles of law, once firmly established,
much more rapidly than would be possible if full sway were
allowed to the normal procedural maneuvering." '
Immediate issuance of the mandate is one of the unusual procedures
our court has employed.12 Another is resort to the All Writs Statute
for authority to issue an injunction pending appeal.18 In some voting
cases, we have been faced with newly enacted registration requirements
which, though constitutional on their face and administered without
discrimination, actually harmed unregistered Negroes by "freezing"
the imbalance resulting from past discrimination. In such cases we
have relied on the so-called "freezing" principle to enjoin enforcement
of the requirement.' 4 The "freezing" principle is grounded in the
court's equity power to eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past
as well as to bar discrimination in the future. 15
The adversary system of litigation, even with benefit of class
actions, is an inefficient instrument for effecting socio-legal changes on a
broad scale. Until Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
school desegregation in the Deep South seemed almost hopelessly
bogged down. School desegregation plans differed widely from district
to district in content and in extent of enforcement. To develop uni-
form school plans and to avoid a trial court's misunderstanding of our
decisions, our court worked out boiler plate decrees, which in effect
amounted to guidelines, long before the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare issued its guidelines.' 6
9 Tuttle, supra note 3, at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
10 Id. at 264.
11 Id. at 257.
12 Kennedy v. Bruce, 298 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1962).
'3 United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 893
(1962); see Chapman, Expediting Equitable Relief in the Courts of Appeals, 53 CORNELL L.
RaV. 12, 16-20 (1967).
14 United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759, 768 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Louisiana,
225 F. Supp. 353, 393 (E.D. La. 1963), aft'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
15 United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759, 768-69 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 393 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
16 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966),
[Vol. 53:6
TRIBUTE TO CHIEF JUDGE TUTTLE
In the broad field of civil rights, federal courts have had to con-
tend with every form of state opposition from "massive resistance" and
the "doctrine of interposition" to sophisticated circumvention in the
form of subtle state involvement in private discrimination. The issues
raised in the civil rights decisions test the strength of our federal
system and the capability of federal courts to perform their political
mission in the body politic. Civil rights issues, if I may disagree with
Burke Marshall, do not "cut into the fabric of federalism."'17 Civil rights
were woven into the fabric when the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights replaced the Articles of Confederation. Or they became a part
of the fabric of federalism when the Civil War Amendments created
unique rights inherent in national citizenship. The civil rights de-
cisions carry out the design of the federal system by making meaningful
constitutionally-created and congressionally-protected rights that other-
wise are meaningless or frustrated in state courts. Federal legal
supremacy, a necessary consequence of the supremacy clause, is there-
fore essential to the integrity of judicial process and serves as an
important instrumentality in making the system workable.
This is not the place for an extended study of Judge Tuttle's
opinions. Nor am I the one to make the study. It is impossible for me
to dissociate the Tuttle in the opinions from the Tuttle in conference,
in council, in correspondence, in public, in private, in all his rela-
tions with me and with other members of the court. But one conclu-
sion is inescapable: Judge Tuttle has made an enduring contribution
to American federalism by his insistance on preserving the integrity of
judicial process in federal courts. This has been accomplished within
the framework of the Constitution and within accepted bounds of
judicial restraint. Anyone who knows Elbert Tuttle at all knows that
his sensitive conscience would not permit him to deviate from The
Law: Judges above all men must obey the rules. I salute a great Judge.
adopted en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1967); Lockett v. Board of Educ., 342 F-2d 225 (5th
Cir. 1965); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1963).
For voting cases, see United States v. Palmer, 356 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Ward, 345 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1965). On exclusion of Negroes from juries, see, e.g., Scott v.
Walker, 358 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1966).
17 B. MARsHALL, FEDERALIsM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 81 (1964).
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